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FOR PUBLICATION 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

DANIEL ANDREWS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

CITY OF HENDERSON; PHILLIP  WATFORD; KARL LIPPISCH, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

HENDERSON POLICE DEPARTMENT; JOSEPH W. EBERT; R. ADAMS; K. LAPEER; K. LIPPISCH, 

Defendants. 

No. 20-17053 

D.C. No. 

2:18-cv-01625- JCM-BNW 

OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada 

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted August 9, 2021 San Francisco, California 

Filed May 23, 2022 

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2 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

Before: Eugene E. Siler,* Morgan Christen, and 

Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge Forrest 

SUMMARY** 

Civil Rights 

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial, on  

summary judgment, of qualified immunity to two police  

detectives in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983  

alleging defendants used excessive force, in violation of the  

Fourth Amendment, when, without warning, they tackled  

plaintiff to the ground, fracturing his hip. 

Defendants believed they had probable cause to arrest  

plaintiff for a series of armed robberies and forcibly tackled  

him as he was leaving a Nevada state courthouse. The panel  

held that the use of force was substantial. Although plaintiff  

was suspected of a serious crime, viewing the evidence in  

his favor, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was  

not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the  

courthouse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury  

could find that the degree of force used against plaintiff  

violated his Fourth Amendment right against excessive  

force, and the detectives were not entitled to summary  

* The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the  

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It  

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 3 

judgment on the question of whether they committed a  

constitutional violation. 

The panel further held that Blankenhorn v. City of  

Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) clearly established— 

and thus put a prudent officer on notice—that an officer  

violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top  

of a relatively calm, non-resisting suspect who posed little  

threat of safety without any prior warning and without  

attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest.  

The panel held that it lacked pendent appellate  

jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the City of  

Henderson’s separate motion for summary judgment  

because the issue of the City’s § 1983 municipal liability was  

not inextricably intertwined with the detectives’ claim of  

qualified immunity. 

COUNSEL 

Michael J. Oh (argued), Senior Assistant City Attorney;  

Nicholas G. Vaskov, City Attorney; Office of the City  

Attorney, Henderson, Nevada; for Defendants-Appellants. 

Peter Goldstein (argued), Peter Goldstein Law Corp., Las  

Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

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4 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

OPINION 

FORREST, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiff Daniel Andrews exited a Nevada state  

courthouse and, without warning, two plainclothes  

detectives tackled him to the ground, fracturing his hip.  

Andrews was not resisting, fleeing, or committing a crime.  

Moreover, because he had just passed through the  

courthouse’s security checkpoint, including a metal detector  

and x-ray scanner, the detectives knew that Andrews was  

unarmed. Andrews sued the detectives and the City of  

Henderson (collectively, Defendants) under 42 U.S.C.  

• 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth  

Amendment. The detectives moved for summary judgment  

arguing that they are protected by qualified immunity, and  

the City moved for summary judgment arguing Andrews  

could not establish municipal liability under any of the  

theories that he advanced. The district court denied the  

detectives’ motion and denied the City’s motion except as to  

Andrews’s ratification theory. We affirm. 

1. Background 
2. Factual History1

After a series of armed robberies at various businesses in  

Henderson, Nevada, detectives with the Henderson Police  

1 Because this case comes to us on review of the district court’s  

ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we view the facts  

in the light most favorable to Andrews. Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d  

1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2021). But “[w]e do not credit a party’s version of  

events that the record, such as an unchallenged video recording of the  

incident, ‘quite clearly contradicts.’” Id. (quoting Scott v. County of San  

Bernardino, 903 F.3d 943, 952 (9th Cir. 2018)). 

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 5 

Department (HPD) began surveilling a woman suspected of  

assisting a man with a recent robbery. On January 3, 2017,  

the woman left a gas station in a car driven by an unidentified  

man, and several plainclothes detectives followed behind.  

The detectives learned from the lead detective on the case  

that the driver was Andrews and that they had probable cause  

to arrest him for the armed robberies. The detectives  

followed the pair to the Henderson Justice Facility parking  

lot and watched as they exited the vehicle. 

The detectives observed Andrews and the woman walk  

into the Henderson Municipal Courthouse. To enter the  

courthouse, the pair had to pass through a security  

checkpoint that included a metal detector and x-ray scanner.  

One detective followed Andrews and the woman into the  

courthouse and tracked their location. The other detectives  

waited outside so they could arrest Andrews after he exited  

the courthouse because they knew he would be unarmed at  

that point, having passed through the courthouse’s metal  

detectors. All of the detectives were in plain clothes. 

Twenty minutes after entering the courthouse, Andrews  

and the woman reemerged, and Detectives Phillip Watford  

and Karl Lippisch walked slowly toward them without  

identifying themselves. When Detective Watford was  

approximately a foot away from Andrews, he lunged and  

tackled him to the ground. Detective Lippisch also jumped  

toward Andrews and Detective Watford and landed on top  

of them as they fell. Detective Lippisch kept his weight on  

Detective Watford’s back as Detective Watford handcuffed  

Andrews’s arms behind his back. The detectives’ takedown  

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6 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

resulted in an acetabular2 fracture of Andrews’s hip, which  

required two surgeries. 

After the arrest, Detective Watford prepared a “use of  

force” report detailing the event. Several of Detective  

Watford’s supervisors reviewed the report and video footage  

of the arrest and determined that the use of force did not  

violate HPD policy or warrant further action.  

1. Procedural History 

Andrews sued Detectives Watford and Lippisch and the  

City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a Fourth Amendment  

excessive-force claim against the detectives and a  

municipal-liability claim against the City. Andrews alleged  

three theories of municipal liability: (1) failure to train;  

(2) unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy; and  

(3) ratification. The Defendants moved for summary  

judgment, the detectives arguing that they were entitled to  

qualified immunity and the City arguing that it did not fail to  

train its officers on the proper use of force or have a policy  

or custom allowing officers to use excessive force. The City  

also contended that Andrews did not identify an individual  

with final policy-making authority who ratified the  

detectives’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct. 

The district court denied the detectives’ motion for  

summary judgment raising qualified immunity. It concluded  

that there was a genuine factual dispute regarding whether  

the detectives used objectively reasonable force against  

Andrews. It also determined that the law in this circuit,  

including Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477,  

2 An acetabular fracture is caused by a high-energy impact to the  

bone. 

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 7 

481 (9th Cir. 2007), “clearly established” that “force is only  

justified when there is a need for force” and that it is  

excessive to “gang tackle” a person “who was suspected of  

a minor crime, posed no apparent threat to officer safety, and  

could be found not to have resisted arrest.” Viewing the facts  

in the light most favorable to Andrews, the district court  

found that the detectives knew Andrews was unarmed and  

was not resisting arrest, attempting to flee, or committing a  

crime when they arrested him. Thus, the district court  

concluded that “there was simply no clear need for force.” 

The district court granted in part and denied in part the  

City’s motion for summary judgment. It rejected Andrews’s  

longstanding-policy-or-practice and failure-to-train theories,  

concluding that he failed to present any supporting evidence.  

But it denied summary judgment on Andrews’s ratification  

theory, concluding that the detectives’ contradicting  

versions of events, “in addition to the fact that the  

[detectives] were not disciplined, raises a genuine dispute as  

to whether their decision to use excessive force was  

ratified.”3 Defendants timely appealed. 

1. Discussion 
2. Qualified Immunity 

Qualified immunity shields government officials from  

civil damages unless an official “violate[s] a clearly  

established constitutional right.” Monzon v. City of  

Murrieta, 978 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020). Thus, in  

3 Although the City argued that Andrews failed to “put forth  

evidence indicating that [the detectives’] superiors are final  

policymakers,” the district court declined to address this point because  

the City raised it in reply, which denied Andrews “an adequate  

opportunity to respond.” 

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8 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

determining whether a police officer is entitled to qualified  

immunity, courts ask two questions: (1) whether “the  

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right[,]” and  

(2) “whether the right was clearly established in light of the  

specific context of the case.” Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d  

1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Tuuamalemalo v.  

Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 476 (9th Cir. 2019)). 

Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction  

over interlocutory appeals from denials of qualified  

immunity. Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d  

938, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2017); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have  

the authority to review such denials “because [q]ualified  

immunity is immunity from suit, not just a defense to  

liability,” and “[t]he immunity is effectively lost if a case is  

erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Isayeva, 872 F.3d at  

944–45 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But  

our jurisdictional power is limited to legal issues, not factual  

disputes. Williamson v. City of Nat’l City, 23 F.4th 1146,  

1151 (9th Cir. 2022). In other words, “[a] public official may  

not immediately appeal a fact-related dispute about the  

pretrial record, namely, whether or not the evidence in the  

pretrial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact  

for trial.” Estate of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731  

(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Foster v. City of Indio, 908 F.3d  

1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2018)) (internal quotation marks  

omitted). But we can decide whether “taking the facts in the  

light most favorable to the non-moving party, the defendants  

are entitled to qualified immunity.” Isayeva, 872 F.3d at 945.  

And in making this determination, we exercise de novo  

review. Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.  

2019). 

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 9 

1. Fourth Amendment violation 

The central question in determining whether law  

enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment by  

using excessive force is “whether the officers’ actions are  

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances  

confronting them.” Williamson, 23 F.4th at 1151 (internal  

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lombardo v.  

City of St. Louis, 141 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2021). “All  

determinations of unreasonable force ‘must embody  

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to  

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are  

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of  

force that is necessary in a particular situation.’” Scott v.  

Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham  

1. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)). 

“Neither tackling nor punching a suspect to make an  

arrest necessarily constitutes excessive force.” Blankenhorn,  

485 F.3d at 477 (quoting Graham, 390 U.S. at 396)  

(emphasis added). Instead, whether a constitutional violation  

occurred depends on “(1) the severity of the intrusion on the  

individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the  

type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the government’s  

interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the  

gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the  

government’s need for that intrusion.” Rice, 989 F.3d  

at 1121 (quoting Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248,  

1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks  

omitted). We address each of these considerations in turn. 

1. Type and amount of force 

“We consider the ‘specific factual circumstances’ of the  

case in classifying the force used.” Williamson, 23 F.4th at  

1151–52 (quoting Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256). Relevant to our  

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10 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

analysis are the “nature and degree of physical contact” and  

“the risk of harm and the actual harm experienced.” Id.  

at 1152 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  

“The presence of non-minor physical injuries . . . is certainly  

relevant in evaluating the degree of the Fourth Amendment  

intrusion.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 824–25 (9th  

Cir. 2010). 

A physical tackle that results in severe injury may  

constitute a significant use of force. In Rice, for example, we  

held that an officer’s takedown maneuver that resulted in the  

suspect falling face-first onto the pavement was a  

“substantial” and “aggressive” use of force where the  

suspect suffered “‘extreme pain’ immediately following his  

arrest and long-term physical pain for which he received  

medical treatment.” 989 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Santos v.  

Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). Likewise, in  

Santos, we held that an officer’s use of force was “quite  

severe” where the suspect taken to the ground “suffered a  

broken vertebra which caused him both pain and  

immobility.” 287 F.3d at 853–54; see also Blankenhorn,  

485 F.3d at 479 (finding that officers acted unreasonably in  

“gang-tackling” a plaintiff); Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d  

1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that grabbing a suspect  

by the arms, forcibly throwing her to the ground, and  

twisting her arms could constitute excessive force). In  

contrast, in Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650,  

652 (9th Cir. 2001), we found that a broken finger during a  

routine arrest was a “minimal” intrusion. 

In this case, the detectives forcibly tackled Andrews to  

the ground with enough force to fracture his hip. The injury  

resulted in “excruciating pain” and required two surgeries.  

Under these circumstances, we conclude that this use of  

force by the detectives was “substantial” and, therefore,  

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 11 

“must be justified by the need for the specific level of force  

employed.” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Santos, 287 F.3d  

at 855 and Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825). 

1. Governmental interest 

We evaluate the government’s interest in using force by  

considering three primary factors: “(1) how severe the crime  

at issue was, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate  

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether  

the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to  

evade arrest by flight.” Williamson, 23 F.4th at 1153  

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he ‘most  

important’ is the second factor—whether the suspect posed  

an immediate threat to others.” Id. These factors are not  

exclusive, however, and must be considered under the  

totality of the circumstances, including whether “less  

intrusive alternatives” were available to the officers and  

whether the officers gave “proper warnings” before using  

force. Rice, 989 F.3d at 1122.; see Bryan, 630 F.3d at 831  

(“[W]hile by no means dispositive, that [the officer] did not  

provide a warning before deploying the [taser] and  

apparently did not consider less intrusive means of effecting  

[plaintiff’s] arrest factor significantly into our Graham 

analysis.”). 

Applying these factors, we conclude that the  

government’s interest in using substantial force was minimal  

here. Armed robbery is a serious crime that poses an obvious  

risk of violence, and this factor suggests that the government  

may have an interest in using force to effect an arrest. See  

S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2019),  

cert. denied sub nom. Browder v. Nehad, 141 S. Ct. 235  

(2020). But we must consider this fact in the full context that  

the officers faced, including that Andrews was not engaged  

in any violent or nonviolent criminal conduct when he was  

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12 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

tackled without warning by the detectives. Moreover, taking  

the evidence in the light most favorable to Andrews, the  

detectives knew that he was not armed when they tackled  

him as he exited the courthouse. That is why the officers  

chose to act when they did. Thus, the risk of violence  

attributable to Andrews’s suspected crimes was mitigated by  

the specific circumstances in which the officers chose to act. 

Nor does the evidence show that Andrews otherwise  

posed a threat to the officers or members of the public. He  

was not exhibiting any aggressive behavior, and there were  

no bystanders within his close proximity when he exited the  

courthouse. And because Andrews did not know the  

detectives’ identities before they tackled him, there is no  

dispute that he was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee. 

Additionally, the detectives do not challenge the district  

court’s finding that they failed to present “undisputed facts  

to suggest that tackling [Andrews] was the only option  

available to them.” See Young v. County of Los Angeles,  

655 F.3d 1156, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011) (“That [the defendant  

employed intermediate force] given the availability of other,  

less intrusive measures makes clear just how limited was the  

government’s interest in the use of significant force.”);  

Bryan, 630 F.3d at 831. They also do not dispute that they  

gave Andrews no warning before they tackled him. See  

Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 876 (9th Cir.  

2011) (“[W]arnings should be given, when feasible, if the  

use of force may result in serious injury.” (internal quotation  

marks and citation omitted)). Given this broader context, the  

nature of Andrews’s suspected crime does not establish a  

strong governmental interest in using significant physical  

force against him. 

In arguing to the contrary, the detectives assert that they  

had a strong interest in using force because Andrews was  

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 13 

suspected of committing multiple armed robberies and,  

therefore, posed “legitimate, significant risks” to the safety  

of others outside the courthouse. We do not suggest that the  

severity of the suspected crime has no bearing on whether a  

suspect poses a threat to officers or the public—of course it  

does. See Browder, 929 F.3d at 1136; Monzon, 978 F.3d  

at 1157. But the serious nature of a suspected crime does not  

necessarily give rise to a strong governmental interest in the  

use of significant physical force. See Browder, 929 F.3d  

at 1136. 

Our precedent requires that we focus on the immediate  

threat of harm. That is, we consider the “danger a suspect  

poses at the time force is applied.” Id. (emphasis added); see  

1. (“Even if [the suspect] had made felonious threats or  

committed a serious crime prior to [the officer’s] arrival, he  

was indisputably not engaged in any such conduct when [the  

officer] arrived, let alone when [the officer] fired his  

weapon.”); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th  

Cir. 2005) (holding that the suspected domestic violence  

crime provided minimal justification for the officers’ use of  

force where the suspect “was standing on his porch alone and  

separated from his wife” and “had no guns or weapons in his  

possession”). 

Thus, as we have explained, although Andrews was  

suspected of a serious crime, viewing the evidence in his  

favor, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was  

not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the  

courthouse. Accordingly, because any immediate threat to  

safety was minimal, “the nature of the crime at issue  

provides little, if any, basis for the officers’ use of physical  

force.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. 

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14 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

1. Balance of interests 

Finally, we weigh whether the detectives’ “degree of  

force used was warranted by the governmental interests at  

stake,” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir.  

2001), and we conclude that it is not. The detectives’ interest  

in using significant force against Andrews is undermined by  

their knowledge that he was unarmed; his lack of any  

aggressive, threatening, or evasive behavior; and the  

detectives’ failure to provide any prior warning or consider  

less intrusive alternatives before forcibly tackling him to the  

ground. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could  

find that the degree of force used against Andrews violated  

his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and the  

detectives are not entitled to summary judgment on the  

question of whether they committed a constitutional  

violation. See Rice, 989 F.3d at 1124. 

2. Clearly Established Right 

Even if a government official violates a constitutional  

right, the official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the  

violated right was clearly established at the time of the  

incident. Id. at 1120. A constitutional right is clearly  

established if it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable  

official would have understood that what he is doing violates  

that right.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7  

(2021) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7,  

11 (2015)). 

The Supreme Court has increasingly reiterated that to  

meet this standard a right “must be defined with specificity”  

rather than “at a high level of generality.” City of Escondido  

1. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (per curiam) (citation  

omitted); see City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11  

(2021). “Such specificity is ‘especially important in the  

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 15 

Fourth Amendment context,’ where it is ‘sometimes difficult  

for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine,  

here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the  

officer confronts.’” Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11–12 (quoting  

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). Thus, “[a]lthough this Court’s  

case law does not require a case directly on point for a right  

to be clearly established, existing precedent must have  

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond  

debate.” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 7–8 (quoting White v.  

Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)) (internal quotation marks  

omitted). 

In Blankenhorn, we analyzed whether a three-officer  

“gang tackle”4 of a person suspected of misdemeanor  

trespass at a shopping mall amounted to excessive force  

under the Fourth Amendment. 485 F.3d at 467–70. In that  

case, when the suspect refused an officer’s orders to kneel  

and be handcuffed, several officers “immediately . . . jumped  

on [him]” and tackled him to the ground while punching him  

several times in the face and body. Id. at 469–70. 

In concluding that a rational jury could find that the  

officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable, we  

found it significant that the severity of the suspected offense  

was minimal and the officers’ “only bases for suspecting that  

[the plaintiff] was interfering with mall business were his  

presence at the mall, his previous banishment, his known  

gang association, and the attention by security.” Id. at 478.  

We also concluded that the suspect “did not pose a serious  

threat to the officers’ or others’ safety” where the officers  

stood around with their arms folded and did not prevent mall  

4 Blankenhorn does not define “gang tackle,” but it is clear that this  

term refers to an incident where more than one officer uses bodily force  

to bring an individual “to the ground.” 485 F.3d at 478. 

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16 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

patrons from entering the area. Id. Finally, although the  

suspect verbally refused to comply with one officer’s  

direction that he kneel down, we held that a reasonable jury  

could conclude that the officers’ use of force was  

unreasonable because they did not employ a lesser means of  

force before immediately tackling the plaintiff, and the  

plaintiff did not resist a lesser means of force before he was  

tackled. Id. at 478–79. 

We hold that Blankenhorn clearly established—and thus  

“put a prudent officer on notice”—that an officer violates the  

Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a  

“relatively calm,” non-resisting suspect who posed little  

threat of safety without any prior warning and without  

attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest.  

485 F.3d at 478, 481. As discussed above, these are the basic  

facts of this case when viewed in the light most favorable to  

Andrews. He was not fleeing, resisting arrest, or actively  

committing a crime, and the detectives knew that he was  

unarmed and specifically planned their tackle for that  

moment because of that knowledge. Accordingly, after  

Blankenhorn, it was “beyond debate” that their actions were  

objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. White,  

137 S. Ct. at 551. 

The only relevant distinction between this case and  

Blankenhorn is the nature of the suspected crimes—trespass  

versus armed robbery. The detectives claim that this  

distinction warrants reversal because Blankenhorn is only  

factually similar when analyzed at an inappropriately “high  

level of generality.” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 8. We  

reject this assertion. In both cases, the suspects posed no  

immediate threat to the officers or public safety when they  

were arrested. And other than the nature of the suspected  

crime, the facts of this case are either analogous to or more  

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 17 

favorable to Andrews than the facts in Blankenhorn. For  

example, the suspect in Blankenhorn was “rude,  

uncooperative, and verbally abusive” before his arrest.  

485 F.3d at 469. But here, Andrews had no interaction with  

the detectives before they tackled him so they had no sense  

of whether he would be cooperative or not. Accordingly, we  

hold that Blankenhorn involved sufficiently similar facts to  

“move [this] case beyond the otherwise hazy borders  

between excessive and acceptable force.” Rivas-Villegas,  

142 S. Ct. at 9. 

This conclusion is further buttressed by our precedent  

clearly establishing that a suspect’s previous violent conduct  

does not justify non-trivial force where the suspect poses no  

immediate safety threat. See, e.g., Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. In  

Smith, for example, a woman called the police to report  

domestic abuse by her husband and informed them “that [he]  

did not have a gun” and “there were no weapons in the  

house.” Id. at 693. While arresting the husband, the officers  

pepper sprayed him, threw him to the ground, and ordered a  

dog to attack him. Id. at 694. In holding that the officers used  

excessive force, we explained that the severity of the  

husband’s crime provided “little” justification for the  

officers’ use of substantial force because “[the husband] was  

standing on his porch alone and separated from his wife,”  

and because “[he] had no guns or other weapons in his  

possession and there were none in the house.” Id. at 702–03.  

There, as in this case, we held that the government’s interest  

in using significant force was low as there was no “basis for  

believing that [the husband] was armed or that he posed an  

immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Id. at 702. 

We have held this general principle to be true even in  

cases where the officers did know that a suspect was armed.  

See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2013)  

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18 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

(finding that officers used excessive force against a  

knowingly armed domestic violence suspect where his wife  

“was unscathed and not in jeopardy when deputies arrived,”  

and the man was “not in the vicinity” but “on the couple’s  

rear patio.”); Glenn, 673 F.3d at 873 (finding that the  

officer’s use of a bean bag gun against a suicidal suspect  

brandishing a knife was excessive where he was not  

threatening anyone but himself); Harris v. Roderick,  

126 F.3d 1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that deadly  

force against an armed suspect who had engaged in a shoot 

out the previous day was not justified where he was running  

back inside the cabin where he resided and made no  

threatening movements). Thus, in addition to Blankenhorn,  

we find this precedent provided the detectives with ample  

notice that their surprise takedown violated Andrews’s  

Fourth Amendment rights. See Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct.  

at 9. 

In sum, it was clearly established before the events of  

this case that the Fourth Amendment prohibits multiple  

officers from physically tackling a “relatively calm” suspect  

without providing any warning where the suspect is not  

posing an immediate danger to anyone, resisting arrest, or  

trying to flee unless the officers first attempt a less intrusive  

means of arrest. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481. 

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial  

of qualified immunity at summary judgment. 

1. Pendent Jurisdiction 

Although this case comes before us on interlocutory  

appeal, the City requests that we exercise pendant  

jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of its separate  

motion for summary judgment on Andrews’s ratification  

theory. “A municipality is not entitled to assert the defense  

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ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 19 

of qualified immunity.” Hernandez v. City of San Jose,  

897 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Huskey v. City  

of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Thus the  

rule . . . that individual defendants can appeal from the denial  

of a motion for a summary judgment to obtain review of the  

merits of their qualified immunity defense does not empower  

a federal court to consider the denial of a municipality’s  

motion for a summary judgment in a § 1983 action.” Huskey,  

204 F.3d at 902. 

Nevertheless, a court may exercise pendent jurisdiction  

and “review an otherwise non-appealable ruling when it is  

‘inextricably intertwined’ with . . . the order properly before  

[the court].” Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 891 F.3d 1147,  

1154 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d  

807, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2003)). This standard is met only when  

the issues are “(a) . . . so intertwined that [the Court] must  

decide the pendent issue in order to review the claims  

properly raised on interlocutory appeal, or (b) resolution of  

the issue properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily  

resolves the pendent issue.” Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1139– 

40. We interpret this standard “narrowly” and apply it only  

in “extremely limited” circumstances. Id. at 1139 (quoting  

Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2016)). 

We conclude that the City’s § 1983 municipal liability is  

not inextricably intertwined with the detectives’ claim of  

qualified immunity. The detectives’ qualified immunity  

defense turns on whether they violated clearly established  

federal law, but the City’s liability turns on whether an  

“official with final policy-making authority ratified a  

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the  

basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47  

(9th Cir. 1992). We need not decide the ratification issue in  

order to resolve whether the detectives are entitled to  

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20 ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON 

qualified immunity. See Hernandez, 897 F.3d at 1139–40.  

Nor does our qualified immunity decision “necessarily  

resolve[]” whether the City ratified the detectives’  

unconstitutional use of force. See id.; Swint v. Chambers  

County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 50–51 (1995). Accordingly,  

we lack pendent appellate jurisdiction over the denial of the  

City’s motion for summary judgment on Andrews’s  

ratification theory. 

AFFIRMED.